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investors from controlling shareholder opportunism. In this Article, we argue that the
existing director-election regime significantly undermines the ability of independent
directors to effectively perform their oversight role. Both the election and retention of
independent directors normally depend on the controlling shareholders. As a result,
these directors have incentives to go along with controllers’ wishes, or, at least, have
inadequate incentives to protect public investors.
To induce independent directors to perform their oversight role, we argue, some
independent directors should be accountable to public investors. This can be achieved
by empowering investors to determine or at least substantially influence the election
or retention of these directors. These “enhanced-independence” directors should play
a key role in vetting “conflicted decisions,” where the interests of the controller and
public investors substantially diverge, but not have a special role with respect to other
corporate issues. Enhancing the independence of some directors would substantially
improve the protection of public investors without undermining the ability of the
controller to set the firm’s strategy.
We explain how the Delaware courts, as well as other lawmakers in the United
States and around the world, can introduce or encourage enhanced-independence
arrangements. Our analysis offers a framework of director election rules that allows
policymakers to produce the precise balance of power between controlling shareholders
and public investors that they find appropriate. We also analyze the proper role of
enhanced-independence directors as well as respond to objections to their use. Overall,
we show that relying on enhanced-independence directors, rather than independent
directors whose elections fully depend on the controller, can provide a better
foundation for investor protection in controlled companies.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2012, Google adopted a controversial recapitalization plan that allowed
it to issue a new class of nonvoting stock.1 This plan enabled Google to continue
raising capital without weakening its founders’ control over the company. To
address the concern that the plan would benefit the company’s controlling
shareholders at the expense of its public investors, Google formed a special
committee of independent directors to negotiate and approve the terms of the
recapitalization.2 Furthermore, in the settlement of the litigation over the
1 See Simon C.Y. Wong, Google’s Stock-Split Plan Would Replace Stewardship with Dictatorship,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 18, 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/04/googles-stock-split-plan-would [https://per
ma.cc/8UK4-PVCS] (“[Google’s] recent proposal to effect a 2-for-1 stock split by issuing non-voting
shares is an abhorrent idea . . . .”); see also Steven Davidoff Solomon, Thorny Side Effects in Silicon
Valley Tactic to Keep Control, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2013, at B8 (“Google proposed last year that the
company issue a new class of shares with no voting rights.”).
2 See Paul Lee, Note, Protecting Public Shareholders: The Case of Google’s Recapitalization, 5 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 281, 284 (2015) (noting that the special committee of independent directors “negotiated
certain protections” for other shareholders before voting on the plan).
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recapitalization, Google’s independent directors were assigned an important
ongoing role to enforce certain restrictions on the company’s founders.3
If a company, like Google, has a controlling shareholder, a main concern of
corporate law is to address potential conflicts of interest between the controller
and public investors.4 Corporate law has long relied on oversight by independent
directors—directors who have no ties to the controller or the company other than
their service on the board—over corporate decisions where the interests of the
controller substantially diverge from those of the company or its public investors
(hereinafter “conflicted decisions”).5 Both courts and lawmakers have sought to
use independent directors to safeguard against such controller opportunism.6
As we explain in this Article, the existing arrangements for electing directors
undermine the effectiveness of independent director oversight. Because these
arrangements provide controllers with decisive power to appoint independent
directors and decide whether to retain them, independent directors have
significant incentives to side with the controller and insufficient countervailing
incentives to protect public investors in conflicted decisions. Thus, independent
directors currently relied upon to contain controllers’ conflicts cannot be
expected to be effective guardians of public investors’ interests.
We also show how the rules governing the appointment of independent
directors could be refined to make their oversight more effective. To improve the
effectiveness of independent directors in cases of controllers’ conflicts, some
directors should be elected in ways that would make them at least somewhat
accountable to public investors. These directors, which we call “enhancedindependence directors,” should play a key role in approving self-dealing
transactions. We develop a framework of alternative legal rules for obtaining
enhanced independence without undermining the controller’s ability to
determine business strategy in nonconflicted decisions. We also explain how
3 See In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS, 2013 WL 5949928, at *2 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 6, 2013) (incorporating the parties’ settlement agreement, which amended the Transfer
Restriction Agreement to include that it could not be waived or modified without consideration and
approval by a committee of at least two independent directors); see also Revised Stipulation of
Compromise and Settlement at 8, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS, 2013 WL
5949928 (Del. Ch. Nov. 6, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312514116
482/d699828dex404.htm? [https://perma.cc/K49D-BYJ8].
4 We analyze in detail the corporate governance problems of controlled companies in Lucian
A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1263 (2009) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Hamdani, Elusive Quest].
5 Drawing the line between ordinary business decisions and those that should be treated as conflicted
decisions is a complicated task. See infra note 112. In this Article, we do not take a view on this question.
6 While independent director oversight is widely accepted, some writers have expressed
concerns about the extent to which independence is undermined by the power controllers have over
independent directors. For such writings, see, for example, María Gutiérrez & Maribel Sáez,
Deconstructing Independent Directors, 13 J. CORP. L. STUD. 63 (2013), and Donald C. Clarke, The
Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 125, 170-71 (2006).
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courts, regulators, and investors could require or encourage companies to
introduce enhanced-independence directors.
Consider again the Google example. Suppose that minority shareholders had
the right to elect, or at least veto the appointment of, two independent directors.
Such enhanced-independence directors would have had greater incentives to
resist a recapitalization plan that benefitted the controller at the expense of public
investors. The approval of the plan by such independent directors would have
been a more meaningful signal than approval by independent directors who serve
only at the controller’s will.
The enhanced-independence approach that we put forward can address
longstanding dilemmas with which the Delaware courts have been wrestling.7 In
well-known decisions involving freezeout transactions, Delaware courts have
recognized the structural problems afflicting independent directors, choosing not
to defer to the approval of freezeouts by such directors and, instead, to grant
judicial deference only to transactions also approved by a majority vote of
minority shareholders. Outside the freezeout context, however, the Delaware
courts have not always followed such an approach, and some decisions have
granted significant cleansing power to independent director approval in cases of
controller conflicts.
For example, Delaware courts substantially rely on independent directors to
make decisions regarding derivative actions against the controller. Such judicial
decisions might be due to concerns about the costs of alternatives. For courts
influenced by such concerns, enhanced-independence directors can offer a
workable alternative within the existing framework of corporate law doctrine.
We do not argue in this Article that independent directors should play a key
role in protecting public investors at controlled companies. Some may believe
that market forces—such as reputation—will prevent controlling shareholders
from expropriating public investors. Others may find other measures—such as
public enforcement or approval by minority shareholders—to be necessary or
effective in enhancing investor protection. This Article takes as a given that
corporate law, both in the United States and in many countries around the world,
has long relied substantially on independent directors in controlled companies to
protect public investors in cases of controller conflicts. Given this pervasive
reliance on independent directors, our contribution is twofold. First, we show
that, by itself, approval by independent directors who serve at the pleasure of the
controller cannot serve as an effective device for vetting conflicted decisions.

7 For a more detailed account of the Delaware cases described in the text above, see discussion
infra Section II.B.
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Second, we analyze how to turn independent directors into more effective
guardians of the interests of public investors in conflicted decisions.8
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on controlled
companies and independent directors. Controlled companies constitute a sizeable
minority of large, publicly traded firms in the United States, including well-known
companies such as Facebook, Google, News Corp, and Viacom. Controlled
companies are even more prevalent outside the United States, dominating public
capital markets in Europe and in most countries around the world.
In widely held firms, the chief governance concern is to prevent professional
managers from behaving opportunistically at the expense of investors. In
controlled companies, by contrast, controllers have both the incentives and the
power to police management, but they may use their power to divert value at
the expense of public investors.9 In these companies, therefore, a primary
governance concern is to protect public investors from controller opportunism
and value diversion. Corporate law commonly addresses this concern by
requiring or encouraging the use of independent directors and relying on such
directors to vet self-dealing transactions and other conflicted decisions.
Part II explains the fundamental shortcoming of this approach. Under
existing arrangements, controlling shareholders normally play a decisive role in
the appointment and retention of independent directors. Even independent
directors, therefore, are inherently dependent on the controller for their
election and retention as board members. This regime incentivizes independent
directors to favor the controller, and it fails to provide them countervailing
incentives to protect public investors.
Learning from widely held firms reinforces our critique. The CEOs of such
firms once wielded substantial influence over independent directors’
appointments. Today, however, there is widespread recognition that, to enable
independent directors to monitor the CEO effectively, we should both limit the
CEO’s influence over their appointments and make these directors accountable
to public investors. This recognition underlies the litany of reforms focused on
director elections at widely held firms, including placing director selection in the
hands of nominating committees composed solely of independent directors,

8 Our view is that a majority-of-the-minority vote can be a useful and effective tool in many
contexts for guarding the interests of public investors. However, the question of when such a vote
should be used in conjunction with or instead of enhanced-independence directors is outside the scope
of this Article. In addition, we do not consider in this Article how to define self-dealing and other cases
of controller conflicts. Nor do we discuss the proper test for deciding whether a company is controlled.
The U.S. corporate law system has answers to these questions, as do other systems, and we take those
as given for the purpose of our analysis. Finally, we do not consider in this Article when having a
controlling shareholder is desirable; we take as given for the purposes of our analysis that some companies
have a controlling shareholder that can shape the strategic direction of the company.
9 See infra notes 17–21.
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providing for majority voting, and enabling proxy access.10 If CEOs’ informal
influence over the selection of independent directors compromises their ability
to contain CEO opportunism, controlling shareholders’ absolute control over the
appointment and retention of independent directors is all the more problematic.
Part II concludes by introducing our proposed approach for making
independent directors more effective guardians of the interests of public
investors in controlled companies. Such companies, we argue, should have
some directors who (i) lack the incentives produced by the controller’s
decisive influence over the directors’ appointment and retention and (ii) have
some incentives that flow from making the directors accountable to public
investors. A regime of such enhanced-independence directors requires measures
that will limit controllers’ power over the appointment of these directors
while providing public investors with some degree of influence over this
appointment. Such measures, we show, are not an ivory-tower idea without
real-world precedent. The American Stock Exchange (AMEX) required
them for dual-class companies that went public during a certain period, and
they have been recently introduced in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Israel.
Part III develops a framework for designing enhanced-independence rules
with the desired balance between enhancing independence to limit controller
opportunism and controllers’ legitimate interests in making business
decisions. Public investors may participate in three stages of director elections:
initial appointment, reelection, and termination. For each stage, we identify
different degrees of public investors’ input rights and evaluate the impact of
these rights on investor protection. Public investors, we argue, should at least
have veto rights over the initial appointment, reelection, and termination of
enhanced-independence directors. We also explain, however, that there are
good reasons to consider going beyond veto rights—for example, by
empowering public investors to determine whether enhanced-independence
directors are reelected and terminated.
Part IV focuses on the strategies for implementing an enhanced-independence
approach. Regimes based on judge-made law, such as in Delaware, can encourage
the use of enhanced-independence directors by according significant cleansing
powers only to the approval of conflicted decisions by such directors. By
contrast, regimes based on legislative or regulatory mandates can require the
appointment of some enhanced-independence directors and the approval of
certain conflicted decisions by such directors.
We also discuss the desirable number and role of enhanced-independence
directors. To protect public investors, these directors should play a dominant
role in—and only in—vetting self-dealing transactions and other conflicted
decisions. To preserve controllers’ ability to set the company’s business
10

See infra notes 25–31, 49–50 and accompanying text.
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strategy, however, such directors should not play a dominant role in other
corporate affairs, and they should therefore not constitute a substantial
fraction of the members of the board.
Part V considers potential objections to an enhanced-independence approach.
We address claims that enhanced-independence directors would be harmful by
interfering with the controller’s ability to run the company, undermining the
board’s collegiality and cohesiveness, or facilitating abuse by some opportunistic
minority shareholders. We also consider claims that such directors would not add
significantly to the protection of public investors. We show that these objections
do not undermine the case for enhanced-independence directors.
We shall use the terms “minority shareholders” or “public investors” to refer
to shareholders other than the controller. We note that these shareholders
sometimes hold a majority of the equity capital. This is likely to be the case when
a dual-class structure, or another aspect of the corporate structure, separates
voting rights from cash flow rights and enables the controller to retain a lock on
control while holding a minority, even a small minority, of the company’s equity.11
A substantial body of evidence suggests that the risk of value diversion increases
when controllers use dual-class or other ownership structures for separating cash
flow rights from votes.12 Thus, even those who would not support enhancedindependence directors for controlled companies in general should consider
using them for dual-class companies and other structures that separate voting and
cash flow rights.
I. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND CONTROLLED COMPANIES
This Part sets the background for our analysis of director independence at
controlled companies. Section A describes the prevalence of concentrated
ownership and the governance challenges that this ownership structure creates.
11 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity:
The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights (examining ownership
structures where a controlling shareholder retains a small fraction of the firm’s cash flow rights), in
CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295, 297-301 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000). Examining
whether and to what extent structures that separate cash flow rights from voting rights are desirable
is beyond the scope of this Article, and we take the existence of companies with such structures as
given for the purposes of our analysis. For a recent contribution to the debate on dual-class firms
co-authored by one of us, see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for
Perpetual Dual-Class Stock (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus.,
Discussion Paper No. 905, 2017; Harvard Law Sch. Program on Corp. Governance, Discussion Paper
No. 2017-6, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954630 [https://perma.cc/8H6E-ZVAE].
12 For empirical evidence on the link between controllers’ wedge between cash flow and voting
rights and agency costs, see Marianne Bertrand et al., Ferreting Out Tunneling: An Application to Indian
Business Groups, 117 Q. J. ECON. 121 (2002), Paul A. Gompers et al., Extreme Governance: An Analysis of
Dual-Class Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051 (2010), and Chen Lin et al., Ownership
Structure and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2011).
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Section B discusses corporate law’s reliance on independent directors to guard
public investors’ interests.
A. Preventing Controller Opportunism
Controlled companies are important both in the United States and around
the world. In the United States, they constitute a sizeable minority of large,
publicly traded firms.13 As of December 31, 2016, there were 379 Russell 3000
companies with a shareholder holding more than 30% of the company’s voting
shares, and 220 of these companies had one shareholder holding more than 50%
of such shares.14 Controlled companies are even more prevalent outside the
United States. Public companies in Europe, Asia, and Latin America
commonly have a controlling shareholder.15
The governance challenges at controlled companies are fundamentally
different from those at widely held companies.16 At widely held companies, the
fundamental governance problem arises from the divergence of interests between
managers and investors, and so corporate law and governance arrangements aim
to address managerial agency costs. By contrast, the fundamental governance
problem in controlled companies concerns the agency problems between
controllers and public investors.
Controlling shareholders own a significant fraction of the firm’s cash-flow
rights, which gives them a substantial incentive to police management and

13 See Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance:
Evidence from the S&P 500, 58 J. FIN. 1301, 1302 (2003) (observing that roughly 35% of S&P 500 companies
have families as dominant shareholders); Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the
United States, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1377, 1378 (2009) (presenting evidence that “raise[s] doubts about
whether ownership in the United States’ [public firms] is . . . less concentrated than elsewhere”).
14 This data was collected from Factset and ORBIS databases, and was supplemented by information
from public filings on the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR).
15 For empirical research documenting that concentrated ownership is prevalent around the
world, see M. BECHT & C. MAYER, Introduction to THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE 1, 4-7
(Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht eds., 2001); Stijn Claessens et al., The Separation of Ownership and
Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81, 110 (2000); Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang,
The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 378 (2002); and Rafael
La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 511 (1999).
16 See generally Bebchuk & Hamdani, Elusive Quest, supra note 4.
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enhance the company’s value.17 Controllers, however, may also use their power
to divert value at the expense of the company and its public investors.18
Such diversion could take many forms, including selling (or purchasing)
assets, goods, or services to (or from) the company they control on terms that
favor them;19 acquiring equity at below-market prices from either the company
or public investors in a freezeout transaction;20 or paying excessive compensation
to the controller or family members.21 In controlled companies, therefore,
corporate law and governance arrangements should protect public investors from
the controllers’ value diversion.22
B. The Reliance on Independent Directors
A common approach for containing controllers’ conflict is to rely on
independent directors. Legal regimes in the United States and around the
world require or encourage companies to appoint independent directors and
assign them the task of approving self-dealing and other conflicted decisions.
1. The United States
Independent directors are an important feature of U.S. boardrooms. As
Jeff Gordon has documented, the number of independent directors has

17 See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the
Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1651 (2006) (“[A] controlling shareholder may police
the management of public corporations better than the standard panoply of market-oriented
techniques employed when shareholdings are widely held.”); see also Jens Dammann, The Controlling
Shareholder’s General Duty of Care: A Dogma That Should Be Abandoned, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 479, 481
(noting controlling shareholders “have strong financial incentives to make informed decisions in the
best interest of their corporations”).
18 Such extraction is often referred to as “tunneling.” See Vladimir Atanasov et al., Law and
Tunneling, 37 J. Corp. L. 1, 2 (2011). For a review of different methods of tunneling and self-dealing,
see id. at 3, which identifies three general types of tunneling: cash flow, asset, and equity.
19 For empirical studies on diversion via related-party transactions, see Kee-Hong Bae et al.,
Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups, 57 J. FIN. 2695, 2698
(2002), and Guohua Jiang et al., Tunneling Through Intercorporate Loans: The China Experience, 98 J.
FIN. ECON. 1, 2 (2010).
20 For empirical studies on diversion via equity transactions, see, for example, Jae-Seung Baek
et al., Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidence from Private Securities Offerings by Korean Chaebols, 61 J.
FIN. 2415, 2418-19 (2006), and Borja Larrain & Francisco Urzúa I., Controlling Shareholders and Market
Timing in Share Issuance, 109 J. FIN. ECON. 661, 661-62 (2013).
21 For empirical evidence on value diversion through excessive compensation to controlling
families, see Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Controlling Stockholders and the Disciplinary Role of
Corporate Payout Policy: A Study of the Times Mirror Company, 56 J. FIN. ECON. 153, 154-56 (2000).
22 See Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe, 21 J.
ECON. PERSP. 117, 117 (2007) (“[C]oncentrated ownership can create conditions for a new agency
problem, because the interests of controlling and minority shareholders are not aligned.”).
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increased dramatically over time because of both judicial encouragement and
federal mandates.23
At the federal level, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)24 and the
applicable stock exchange listing standards require that boards of widely held
companies have a majority of independent directors.25 These directors are
responsible for key issues that might entail a conflict of interest between
shareholders and management, such as executive compensation,26 appointment
of auditors,27 and certain nomination decisions.28 Federal rules adopt a laxer
approach to director independence at controlled companies.29 While these
companies are still subject to the independent audit committee requirements,
they are not required to have a majority of their directors be independent,30
and they are exempt from the independent compensation and nomination
committee requirements.31
State corporate law has used standards of judicial review to encourage
companies to appoint independent directors and assign them a meaningful role
23 See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950− 2005:
Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007) [hereinafter Gordon, The
Rise of Independent Directors].
24 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6) (2012).
25 See Developments in the Law—Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2169, 2187 (2004)
(“The revised listing standards of both the NYSE and NASDAQ . . . require (with a few exceptions)
that listed-company boards have a majority of independent directors . . . .”).
26 See NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 303A.05(a) (2017), http://nysemanual.
nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm
-sections%2F [https://perma.cc/6PRM-4SVJ] [hereinafter NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL]
(requiring a compensation committee consisting solely of independent directors); see also NASDAQ,
STOCK MKT. INC., MARKETPLACE RULES R. 4350(c)(3)(A)–(B) (2017), https://www.sec.gov/rules/
other/nasdaqllcf1a4_5/nasdaqllcamendrules4000.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWV3-WUW5] [hereinafter
NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULES] (requiring active involvement of either a wholly independent
compensation committee or a majority of independent directors).
27 See Developments in the Law—Corporations and Society, supra note 25, at 2191 (2004) (“Each
exchange mandates that listed companies create an audit committee . . . and every member must meet
. . . rigorous independence requirements . . . .”).
28 See, e.g., NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULES, supra note 26, R. 4350(c)(4)(A) (requiring active
involvement in director nomination of either a wholly independent nomination committee or a
majority of independent directors).
29 See generally NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 26, § 303A.00 (stating that
controlled companies are not required to comply with the independent-director provisions of the
manual); see also NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULES, supra note 26, R. 4350(c)(5) (defining a “controlled
company” as “a company of which more than 50% of the voting power [for the election of directors] is
held by an individual, a group or another company”).
30 See SEC Approves NYSE and NASDAQ Proposals Relating to Director Independence, FINDLAW,
http://corporate.findlaw.com/finance/sec-approves-nyse-and-nasdaq-proposals-relating-to-direct
or.html [https://perma.cc/6REH-6P39] (undated) (discussing recently approved standards for
independent directors for controlled companies on stock exchanges).
31 See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 26, § 303A.00 (exempting controlled
companies from the nominating-committee provisions and the compensation-committee provisions of
the manual).
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in vetting transactions involving conflicts of interest.32 Delaware courts, for
example, have used the entire fairness standard to review certain self-dealing
transactions involving controlling shareholders. Whereas the business judgment
rule substantially insulates a transaction from judicial scrutiny,33 the entire
fairness standard requires the defendants to prove that the transaction was fair
to public investors by showing a fair process and a fair price.34 The active
involvement of an effective, empowered special negotiation committee consisting
solely of independent directors, however, can significantly alleviate the burden
that defendants face.35
2. Around the World
Other countries are also increasingly viewing independent directors as
essential to protecting public investors at controlled companies. Accordingly,
these countries have adopted one or more of the following arrangements.36 First,
32 See Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 23, at 1523-26 (reviewing the role
that Delaware courts played in encouraging public companies to give more power to independent
directors); Steven M. Haas, Note, Toward a Controlling Shareholder Safe Harbor, 90 VA. L. REV. 2245,
2250-70 (2004) (reviewing case law on Delaware’s changing standard of review for self-dealing
transactions approved by independent directors).
33 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1346-47 (Del. Ch. 1981) (discussing the
business judgment exercised by the board and finding that this shielded it), rev’d, 457 A.2d 701 (Del.
1983); see also Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (describing the business
judgment rule as “deferential”).
34 See, e.g., Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1239 (Del. 2012) (explaining that the
standard of review for controlling-shareholder transactions is entire fairness and the burden falls on
the defendant).
35 Such involvement can shift the burden for showing fairness back to the plaintiff. See, e.g.,
Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (stating that “approval of the
transaction by either an independent committee of directors or a[] . . . majority of the minority
shareholders shifts the burden” in entire fairness review from the interested party to the challenging
party). In some cases, the use of both an independent special negotiating committee and approval
by a majority of the minority shareholders will prevent Delaware courts from engaging in an entire
fairness review. See Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 642-44 (Del. 2014) (adopting the
lower court’s ruling that the presence of both procedural safeguards for minority shareholders—an
independent committee of directors and a majority of the minority vote—leads to application of the
business judgment rule).
36 In 2005, the European Commission recommended that member states adopt governance
standards that require directors to be independent of controlling shareholders. See Commission
Recommendation 2005/162/EC of 15 Feb. 2005, 2005 O.J. (L 52) 52, 63, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-cont
ent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32005H0162&from=EN [http://perma.cc/X4B8-QM4M] (recommending
“[t]he presence of independent representatives on the board, capable of challenging the decisions of
management,” and describing what such independence entails). However, some countries’ definitions
of independence overlook ties between directors and controllers. See, for example, the German
approach described in Paul Davies et al., Boards in Law and Practice: A Cross-Country Analysis in Europe,
in CORPORATE BOARDS IN LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN EUROPE 30 & n.120
(Paul Davies et al. eds., 2013), submitting that “in Europe, independent directors are being used for the
wrong purposes.” See also Gutiérrez & Sáez, supra note 6, at 74-75 (noting that “European jurisdictions
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public company boards are expected to include some fraction of independent
directors. Second, independent directors must serve on committees that play an
active role in monitoring management and controlling shareholders. Third, many
countries specifically require that independent directors play an active role in
scrutinizing self-dealing transactions. Below we review some examples of the
increasing reliance on independent directors to police controlling shareholders.
In Europe, independent directors are often expected, if not required, to serve
on the corporation’s audit committee, and they often constitute a significant
fraction of the audit committee’s members.37 Japan, India, Korea, and Russia have
adopted similar requirements.38 In Brazil, Japan, and some European countries,
independent directors play an important role in nomination and remuneration
committees.39 Their presence on the audit, compensation, and nomination
committees provides them with better access to information and the means to
monitor value diversion by controlling shareholders.40
Some countries specifically require that independent directors play an active
role in the vetting of related-party transactions in controlled companies.41 In

have failed to make [the] distinction” between “independent directors in corporations with
concentrated ownership” and independent directors in other corporations).
37 Some countries (such as Germany) require the appointment of only one independent
director. Guido Ferrarini & Marilena Filippelli, Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders
Around the World 23 & n.25 (European Corp. Governance Inst. (ECGI), Working Paper No.
258/2014, May 2014). Others require a majority or two-thirds of independent members. Id. at 23-24,
n.26. Still others require that all members of the committee be independent. Id. at 24, n.27.
38 For studies discussing such requirements in various jurisdictions, see Donald C. Clarke,
Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 99-102 (2007); A.C. Pritchard,
Monitoring of Corporate Groups by Independent Directors, 9 J. KOREAN L. 1, 16 (2009); Colleen R.
Stumpf, Comment, Diverse Economies—Same Problems: The Struggle for Corporate Governance Reform
in Russia and the United States, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 897, 908 (2006); and Umakanth Varottil,
Evolution and Effectiveness of Independent Directors in Indian Corporate Governance, 6 HASTINGS BUS.
L.J. 281, 308-21 (2010).
39 See, e.g., Roberto Barontini et al., Directors’ Remuneration Before and After the Crisis: Measuring
the Impact of Reforms in Europe (analyzing “the impact of recent reforms,” including those related to
independence in remuneration practices, “on directors’ remuneration”), in BOARDS AND
SHAREHOLDERS IN EUROPEAN LISTED COMPANIES: FACTS, CONTEXT AND POST-CRISIS
REFORMS 251 (Massimo Belcredi & Guido Ferrarini eds., 2013).
40 See Paul Krüger Andersen & Dorthe Kristensen Balshøj, Directors’ Conflicts of Interests: A
Contribution to European Convergence (describing the value of independent directors on such
committees), in BOARDS OF DIRECTORS IN EUROPEAN COMPANIES: RESHAPING AND
HARMONISING THEIR ORGANISATION AND DUTIES 63-74 (Hanne S. Birkmose, Mette Neville &
Karsten Engsig Sørensen eds., 2013).
41 See Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Related Party Transactions (discussing how major
jurisdictions regulate related-party transactions, including “Japan and much of continental Europe,”
which “mandate approval by disinterested board members”), in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 101, 105-09, 128-30 (Reinier Kraakman et al.
eds., 2004) (discussing how major jurisdictions regulate related party transactions).
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Italy, for instance, significant related-party transactions require the approval of
an independent committee of the board.42
II. THE LIMITS OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
Empowering independent directors to review self-dealing and other
conflicted decisions might offer public investors at controlled companies
some degree of protection. For example, the incentives of directors to go
along with the preferences of the controller might be less powerful when they
have no ties to the controller other than through their service on the board.
Indeed, academic studies on reforms in Korea, Taiwan, India, China, and
other countries provide evidence suggesting that the appointment of
independent directors at controlled firms can enhance share value.43
In this Part, we argue that independent directors in controlled companies
still have incentives to favor controllers, which undermine their effectiveness
in overseeing controller conflicts. For independent directors to vet conflicted
decisions well, they should have adequate incentives to do so. However, the
prevailing regime that governs director elections provides independent
directors with incentives to favor controlling shareholders and with few
countervailing incentives to protect public investors from self-dealing and
other forms of value diversion.
We would like to clarify at the outset that we do not argue that directors are
exclusively motivated by their desire to get elected or reelected to the board.
Directors’ sense of professionalism and integrity, and fiduciary duties and
norms, may have significant influence on how directors act. Yet corporate law
has chosen, and we believe correctly, not to rely exclusively on such factors. If
we could exclusively rely on them, many key corporate law rules as well as
financial incentive schemes would be unnecessary.

42 See Guido Ferrarini et al., Corporate Boards in Italy (describing measures regarding related-party
transactions required by the Italian Civil Code), in CORPORATE BOARDS IN LAW AND PRACTICE: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN EUROPE, supra note 36, at 367, 400-05.
43 For empirical studies suggesting that introducing independent directors benefitted public
investors in various countries, see Bernard S. Black & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Can Corporate
Governance Reforms Increase Firm Market Values? Event Study Evidence from India, 4 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 749, 751 (2007); Bernard Black & Woochan Kim, The Effect of Board Structure on Firm
Value: A Multiple Identification Strategies Approach Using Korean Data, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 203, 225
(2012); Jay Dahya et al., Dominant Shareholders, Corporate Boards, and Corporate Value: A Cross-Country
Analysis, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 73, 75 (2008); and Yin-Hua Yeh & Tracie Woidtke, Commitment or
Entrenchment?: Controlling Shareholders and Board Composition, 29 J. BANKING & FIN. 1857, 1862-63
(2005). For a study finding that firms with high percentages of independent directors tend to “have
a smaller magnitude of manipulated transfer prices,” see Agnes W.Y. Lo et al., Can Corporate
Governance Deter Management from Manipulating Earnings? Evidence from Related-Party Sales
Transactions in China, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 225, 226 (2010).
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Section A explains how recent developments concerning director independence
at widely held firms should inform our assessment of controlled companies. In
Section B, we discuss the structural incentives of independent directors at
controlled companies. In Section C, we turn to examine how to make independent
director oversight more effective.
A. Learning from Widely Held Firms
At widely held companies, director independence reinforces the
accountability created by public investors’ right to elect directors. Although
lawmakers and investors had focused on regulating director independence,
they have increasingly adopted reforms that enhance public investors’ role in
director elections.
Public investors at widely held companies have the power to elect
members to the board. This power arguably makes directors accountable to
shareholders and incentivizes members of the board to keep shareholders
satisfied with their performance.44 In fact, courts have relied on shareholders’
ability to displace underperforming directors as a reason for deferring to
directors’ business decisions.45
Independence requirements strengthen these market incentives by
ensuring that directors have no conflicts that could undermine their
effectiveness as monitors of management.46 For example, a director whose
livelihood depends on her business ties with the company might fear that
refusing to accept the CEO pay demands would provoke retaliation. Many
investors and lawmakers, however, believe that such independence alone may
not ensure directors’ accountability because management’s influence over the
appointment of directors can also undermine the effectiveness of those
directors as monitors. Even an independent director might fear that adopting
a skeptical approach toward the CEO, for example, would reduce her chances
of reappointment. Moreover, to the extent that the CEO is involved in
appointment decisions, directors may develop a sense of gratitude and

44 But see Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 688-94
(2007) (discussing the impediments to electoral challenges even when shareholder discontent with the
board actions and decisions are significant).
45 See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“The
redress for [directors’] failures . . . must come . . . through the action of shareholders . . . and not
from this Court.”); see also Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp., 978 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Nev. 1997)
(“One of the justifications for the business judgment rule’s insulation of directors from liability . . .
is that unhappy shareholders can always vote the directors out of office.” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Shoen v. AMERCO, 885 F. Supp. 1332, 1340 (D. Nev. 1994))).
46 See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 26, § 303A.02; NASDAQ MARKETPLACE
RULES, supra note 26, R. 5605(2).
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obligation to accommodate the CEO’s preferences.47 These concerns underlie
the post-Enron requirement that independent directors control the board
nomination process, thereby taking from managers the formal power to
influence the process—and thus the outcome—of director elections.48
Proposed reforms have gradually gone beyond director independence and
extended to measures that enhance public investors’ influence over director
election. The majority voting regime for electing directors, for example,
makes it easier for shareholders to prevent the company’s candidates from
joining the board.49 Commentators and activist shareholders have called for
additional reforms that would give a majority of shareholders the power to
elect and fire directors. These include providing shareholders with access to
the ballot and dismantling staggered boards.50
These developments offer two important lessons for controlled companies.
First, controllers’ absolute control over the election of independent directors
undermines those directors’ effectiveness as monitors. Second, enabling public
investors to influence the election of independent directors would provide these
directors with incentives to guard public investors’ interests.
B. Director Independence at Controlled Firms
At controlled companies, independent directors are expected to exercise
oversight to prevent the controller from expropriating value from public
investors. Yet, the same election method that holds directors accountable to
47 See, e.g., Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board
Members: An Empirical Analysis, 54 J. FIN. 1829, 1851 (1999) (observing that “when CEOs are involved
in director selection, companies choose new directors who are less likely to monitor aggressively”).
48 See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 26, § 303A.04(a) (“Listed companies
must have a nominating/corporate governance committee composed entirely of independent
directors.”); see also Michael E. Murphy, The Nominating Process for Corporate Boards of Directors: A
Decision-Making Analysis, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 131, 148 (2008) (noting that “NYSE rules . . . require
the nominating committee to be composed entirely of independent directors”).
49 For reviews of majority voting regimes, see Stephen J. Choi et al., Does Majority Voting Improve
Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1127 (2016), which notes that “[m]any commentators
have argued that majority voting enhances director accountability to shareholders,” and William K.
Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 463
(2007), which explains how majority voting “affords shareholders, in effect, veto power over managements’
candidates.” Vanguard, for instance, has emphasized majority voting in its company engagements. See Our
Governance and Executive Compensation Principles, VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard
-proxy-voting/corporate-governance [https://perma.cc/D5JL-QVG7HRMZ-4SQK] (stating that “directors
should be subject to annual elections by majority vote”).
50 The proxy access reform allows certain shareholders to include their own nominees on the
company’s ballot. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59
BUS. LAW. 43, 47 (2003) (arguing that proxy access is a moderate step toward improving board
accountability); Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205, 211 (2005) (identifying proxy-access bylaws as a way of challenging
management control of the board of directors).
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public investors at widely held companies currently also holds them
accountable to the controller at controlled companies. Controlling shareholders
have decisive power over director appointment. Directors at firms with
controlling shareholders—including independent directors—cannot be elected
or reelected following their initial term—unless the controlling shareholder
supports their candidacies. Nor will they stay in office once the controlling
shareholder decides to end their service on the board.51
This regime provides directors with substantial incentives to keep the
controller satisfied. And incentives aside, social norms often lead individuals
who are placed in a position by a given individual to feel some sense of
gratitude toward that individual.52 The existing election regime also fails to
provide independent directors with adequate countervailing incentives to
protect public investors. Independent directors do not owe their service on
the board to public investors, who can neither elect them nor remove them
from office. If the controller so wishes, these directors would serve on the
board even if a majority of public investors would be happy to see them leave.
Directors’ initial election and retention solely depend on the controller.
There have been extreme cases in which controllers made explicit threats
to fire independent directors that did not go along with their wishes.53 And
while such instances highlight the undesirable incentives produced by the
controller’s power over director election, we should stress that such incentives
exist even when the controller makes no such threat. A well-lawyered
controller would likely cite other reasons when removing a director that
resists the controller’s wishes. Even without explicit threats, directors’
structural dependence is always present.
Delaware courts have long expressed concerns about the potential
dependence of all directors in controlled companies on controllers.54 Yet, as

51 The authority to remove a director generally lies with shareholders, though some states allow
for the board to remove one of its members under certain conditions. See, e.g., NEW YORK BUSINESS
CORPORATION LAW § 706(a) (specifying conditions under which a director may be removed by
action of the board). While removing a director during her term in office may be burdensome, as it
requires a special shareholder meeting, the controller can simply decide not to nominate a director
for another term.
52 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 80-83 (2006) (arguing that CEO influence on the
appointment of independent directors might lead to their having a sense of obligation and loyalty
toward the CEO that can contribute to a tendency to go along with CEO pay wishes).
53 See, e.g., In re Dole Food Co., Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 8703, 2015 WL 5052214, at *13-15
(Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015) (describing threats that a controlling shareholder made against a director
who opposed a transaction proposed by the controller).
54 See, e.g., In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., No. 9962, 2016 WL
301245, at *41 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016) (“[D]elaware decisions have long worried about a controller’s
potential ability to take retributive action against outside directors if they did not support the
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explained below, the Delaware courts have yet to fully recognize the scope
and implications of this structural dependence.
In the context of freezeout transactions, courts have concluded that approval
by a special committee of independent directors does not suffice to eliminate
the need for judicial review.55 In doing so, they have explained their reluctance
to grant full cleansing power to such a committee by expressly invoking
controlling shareholders’ decisive power to appoint independent directors. In an
influential article, then–Vice Chancellor Leo Strine analogized the controller to
“an 800-pound gorilla [that] wants the rest of the bananas” and the independent
directors to “little chimpanzees” who “cannot be expected to stand in the way,
even if the gorilla putatively gives them veto power.”56
Outside the freezeout context, however, Delaware courts have stopped
short of adopting a similar approach to independent director approval. For
example, although derivative suits against the controller involve a significant
divergence of interest between the controller and public investors, Delaware
courts defer to independent directors’ decisions about the fate of these
derivative actions.57 In the seminal Aronson case, the court held that for
plaintiffs to establish the futility of making a demand on the board to sue the
controller, “it is not enough to charge that a director was nominated by or
elected at the behest of those controlling the outcome of a corporate election.”58
Delaware courts have relied on decisions of special litigation committees
consisting of independent directors to dismiss claims against controlling
shareholders.59 Some Delaware decisions have also displayed deference to
compensation arrangements between public companies and their controllers that
controller’s chosen transaction and whether it could cause them to support a deal that was not in the
best interests of the company or its stockholders.”).
55 See, e.g., Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 642 (Del. 2014) (noting that approval
by a Special Committee “of a merger with a buying controlling stockholder” only shifts the burden of
proof under the entire fairness standard).
56 Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of Corporations, 27
DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 509 (2002); see also In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 436
(Del. Ch. 2002) (using the same analogy).
57 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984).
58 Id.; see also Friedman v. Dolan, No. 9425, 2015 WL 4040806, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015)
(stating that “[t]he mere fact that one [director] was appointed by a controller” does not suffice to
overcome the presumption of her independence); Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia,
Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1051 (Del. 2004) (holding that ninety-four percent voting power was
not enough to create reasonable doubt of independence).
It is worth noting that, in a recent opinion, Vice Chancellor Laster insightfully highlighted the
tension between the Aronson line of cases and the recognition in other cases that structural incentives
afflict director decisions. See Ezcorp, 2016 WL 301245, at *90-91.
59 See Pompeo v. Hefner, 1983 WL 20284, at *1-2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 1983) (holding that, by itself,
the appointment of the sole member of a special litigation committee by the controller-defendant does
not automatically require judicial scrutiny such director’s independence); see also Biondi v. Scrushy, 820
A.2d 1148, 1164, 1165 n.41 (Del. Ch. 2003) (reiterating this point).
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were approved by a special committee of independent directors.60 In other cases
involving controller conflicts, Delaware court decisions have been mixed. Some
court decisions granted substantial cleansing power to independent director
approval while other decisions declined to do so.61
To be sure, Delaware courts have often examined whether directors had
some additional ties that provided them with incentives to go along with the
controller. For example, Delaware courts have declined to defer to
independent directors who co-owned a plane with the controller,62 who
provided consulting services to the controller,63 or who served as an employee
of a company over which the controller had considerable influence.64 We
agree that such ties might strengthen the incentives of directors to go along
with the wishes of the controller. However, our key point is that, even without
such additional ties to the controller, service on the controlled company’s
board produces by itself a structural incentives problem.
Independent directors whose service on the board fully depends on the
controller do not have adequate incentives to guard the interests of public
investors in the face of controllers’ conflicts. Using Leo Strine’s metaphor, if
independent directors cannot be expected in the freezeout context to oppose
the big gorilla when it seeks the rest of the bananas, we should not expect
them to resist the big gorilla when it pursues a peach, a mango, or any other
fruit that it might fancy. Thus, we argue, courts and lawmakers should not
60 See Friedman, 2015 WL 4040806, at *5-8 (applying the business judgment rule to the
determination of executive pay and noting that “[e]ntire fairness is not the default standard for
compensation awarded by an independent board or committee, even when a controller is at the helm
of the company”); In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563, 587-88 (Del. Ch.
2007) (applying the business judgment rule to dismiss a claim about a consulting contract with a
member of the controlling family).
61 For a systematic and careful review of cases going in different directions, see Vice Chancellor
Laster’s opinion for the court in Ezcorp, 2016 WL 301245, at *12-15. Vice Chancellor Laster’s analysis
highlights the structural incentives that independent directors in controlled companies have, id. at
*16, and we hope that his analysis will prove influential.
62 See Sandys v. Pincus, No. 157,2016, 2016 WL 7094027, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 5, 2016) (noting that
co-ownership of a private plane “is suggestive of the type of very close personal relationship that, like
family ties, one would expect to heavily influence a human’s ability to exercise impartial judgment”).
63 See In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *34
(Del. Ch. June 4, 2004) (finding a lack of independence when a director provided and was
compensated for financial advisory services to the controlled company).
64 See Del. Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Sanchez, 124 A.3d 1017, 1019 (Del. 2015) (holding that a
director was not independent of controller when he had a close friendship of over half a century with
the controller and his primary employment was as an executive of a company over which the controller
had substantial influence); see also In re Orchard Enters., Inc. Stockholder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 21, 26 (Del.
Ch. 2014) (holding that the question of a director’s independence created issues of fact for trial when
the director had a close relationship and expected future employment with the controller); In re Loral
Space & Commc’ns Inc., 2008 WL 4293781, at *20-21 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 2008) (finding a lack of
independence when a director had a long-standing relationship with the controller and solicited an
investment from the controller during the special committee negotiations).

1290

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 165: 1271

grant substantial cleansing power to decisions made by independent directors
who serve on the board at the controller’s pleasure.65
C. Toward Enhanced Independence
Legal systems that substantially rely on independent directors to vet conflicted
decisions, we argue, should weaken their incentives to favor the controller and
provide them with affirmative incentives to protect public investors. Weakening
directors’ incentives to favor controlling shareholders requires measures that
would limit the controller’s power to appoint and terminate directors. Providing
directors with affirmative incentives to protect public investors requires that the
latter have a say in director election and termination.
In the next Part, we develop a conceptual framework that can guide
policymakers who wish to turn independent directors into effective monitors
of controllers without undermining controllers’ ability to run their companies.
As we explain below,66 one could take power away from the controller without
giving any power to public investors. The approach we find best, however, is to
grant public investors at least some power over director election and
termination, as this power is vital for providing directors with affirmative
incentives to protect public investors.
We do not suggest that public investors have power to influence the
election of all directors or even all independent directors. Rather, we believe
that the election of some directors—enhanced-independence directors—should
not be dictated by the controller. The controller should retain the power to
appoint a majority of board members and run the company through its
representatives on the board. Enhanced-independence directors should play
an active role when a conflict arises between the interests of the controller
and those of public investors. At the very least, public investors should have
the right to veto the controller’s candidates for an enhanced-independence
director position. As we explain below, however, public investors should wield
even greater influence over these directors’ election.
Before discussing our framework in detail, we should note that several
legal regimes—one of them with our active involvement—have adopted
reforms in the direction that we advocate. Below we discuss the regimes
adopted by the AMEX stock exchange in the United States, Italy, the United
Kingdom, and Israel. Because each of these regimes provided public investors
65 We do not discuss the claim, which is beyond the scope of this Article, that approval by
independent directors, despite its limitations, might provide public investors with some protection
and should therefore assist the controller in some way in defending against challenge to a conflicted
decision. Our focus is on showing that any significant deference now accorded to such approval by
independent directors should be reserved only for approval by enhanced-independence directors.
66 See infra Section IV.D.
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with rights to influence the selection of independent directors, they suggest
that the use of such directors is not merely an “ivory tower” idea but a
practical real-world option.
AMEX: In 1976, when the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) did not
allow companies to use the dual-class share structure, AMEX decided to allow
dual-class companies to list on the exchange subject to certain guidelines.
These AMEX guidelines required that shares with inferior voting rights
(normally, public investors) have the power to elect at least one quarter of the
board.67 Although these AMEX requirements have not been in effect since the
mid-1980s, a recent study found twenty-six dual-class companies, including
The New York Times and Dillard, with a governance structure that complies
with this AMEX requirement.68
Italy: Controlled companies dominate Italy.69 Italian law requires public
companies to provide public investors with the power to elect at least one
member to the board.70 Companies must use the slate system for electing
directors:71 Shareholders who meet minimum shareholding criteria may
submit their own slate to compete against the company’s slate.72 Whereas the
candidates who obtain the highest number of votes are elected, at least one
director is elected from the minority slate that receives the most votes.73 A
2013 study found that minority slates were submitted in forty percent of
director elections.74
United Kingdom: In response to a growing number of listings by controlled
firms, in 2014 the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority adopted new
67 See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote
Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 704 n.90 (1986) (“The limited voting class of the common
must have the ability—voting as a class—to elect not less than 25% of the board of directors.”).
68 See Kobi Kastiel, Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism in Controlled Companies, 2016 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 60, 92, 126-27, 127 n.212 (2016) (noting that twenty-six Delaware dual-class firms had
proportional voting for directors in 2012, including the New York Times Company and Dillard’s, Inc.).
69 Massimo Belcredi & Luca Enriques, Institutional Investor Activism in a Context of Concentrated
Ownership and High Private Benefits of Control: The Case of Italy 4 (European Corp. Governance Inst.
(ECGI), Working Paper No. 22/2013, 2014) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2325421
[https://perma.cc/TKA7-TMZ7].
70 See id. at 8 (describing that “minority shareholders’ power to . . . have at least one [director]
candidate appointed” as a “peculiar feature of current Italian corporate governance regulation”).
71 See id. (describing the introduction and operation of slate voting in Italy); see also Ferrarini
et al., supra note 42, at 392-93 (reviewing slate voting in Italy, which requires “at least one director
[to] be elected from the minority slate of directors”).
72 The percentage ownership required to submit a slate cannot exceed 2.5% of outstanding
shares. Barontini et al., supra note 39, at 381.
73 This holds true “provided that [the minority slate] has no link—even indirect—with the
majority slate.” Ferrarini et al., supra note 42, at 392.
74 See Barontini et al., supra note 39, at 389. For a systematic analysis documenting the effect
of this election regime on directors’ dissent in the boardroom, see Piergaetano Marchetti et al.,
Dissenting Directors (European Corp. Governance Inst. (ECGI), Working Paper No. 332/2016, 2016).
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listing rules aimed at improving investor protection in premium-listed controlled
companies.75 This rule requires a dual-voting structure for the election and
reelection of independent directors in controlled companies.76 Under this regime,
the independent director’s election or reelection requires approval by both a
majority of shareholders and a majority of minority shareholders.77
Israel: Finally, Israeli corporate law requires public companies to have at least
two “external directors” on their boards.78 These directors, who must be
independent of the controlling shareholder, serve for three years and can be
reelected to two additional three-year terms.79 While public investors do not have
the power to elect these directors, they hold veto rights over their election.80
Moreover, based on the recommendations of a committee in which we took part,
a recent amendment provides public investors with the power to reelect an
“external director” to the board even against the controller’s objection.81
75 See Fin. Conduct Auth., Listing Rules (Listing Regime Enhancements) Instrument 2014, FCA
2014/33, at 12, https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/instrument/2014/FCA_2014_33.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8XCU-2N3D] [hereinafter Listing Rules Instrument 2014] (“[The rules are] intended to ensure that
the protections afforded to holders of equity shares by the premium listing requirements are
meaningful.” (emphases omitted)). For a review of these rules, see generally Simon Witty et al.,
Enhancing the Effectiveness of The UK Listing Regime—Implementation, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 1, 2014), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/06/01/enhancingthe-effectiveness-of-the-uk-listing-regime-implementation [https://perma.cc/4392-ZAHM].
76 See Listing Rules Instrument 2014, supra note 75, at 19 (requiring a listed company with a
controlling shareholder “to have in place at all times . . . a constitution that allows the election and
re-election of independent directors to be conducted in accordance with [the dual-voting structure]
provisions set out in LR 9.2.2ER and LR 9.2.2FR” (emphasis omitted)).
77 If the results of these two votes conflict, the election of the director in question may be decided
by way of another, single (ordinary) majority vote at a meeting to be held at least ninety but not more
than 120 days after the original vote. See Listing Rules Instrument 2014, supra note 75, at 20-21.
78 Companies Law, 5759-1999, § 239, 44 (1999-119) (as amended). We have been involved in
the development of the Israeli law governing the power of public investors in controlled companies
to influence the election of some external directors. During 2006−2008, Assaf Hamdani chaired,
and Lucian Bebchuk served as an advisor to, a government committee that recommended reforms
to Israel’s corporate law to empower minority shareholders to appoint directors. Subsequently,
during 2011–2012, Lucian Bebchuk served as the outside-expert advisor to Israel’s Economic
Concentration Committee whose recommendation led to further enhancing the power of the
minority shareholders to elect directors in a subset of Israeli controlled companies.
79 Id. § 245.
80 Id. § 239(b).
81 Similarly, we should note that Swedish corporate law provides public investors with influence
over the nomination of some directors in a subset of controlled companies. The Swedish Code of
Corporate Governance sets forth the procedure for establishing a nomination committee for board
members, and typically representatives of the three to five largest shareholders in the company are
appointed members of the committee. Even when the company has a dominant shareholder, at least one
member of the committee must be independent of the company’s largest shareholder. See Rolf Skog &
Erik Sjöman, Corporate Governance in Sweden, in THE NORDIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL
247 app. D at 260-62 (Per Lekvall ed., 2014). When the dominant shareholder owns less than fifty percent
of the voting power, such shareholder must cooperate with other public shareholders in order to secure
a majority vote at the annual general meeting. See Rolf H. Carlsson, Swedish Corporate Governance and
Value Creation: Owners Still in the Driver’s Seat, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE 1038, 1049-50 (2007).

2017]

Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders

1293

III. ENHANCED INDEPENDENCE: BUILDING BLOCKS
Turning independent directors into enhanced-independence directors
raises complex issues of legal design. In Section A, we develop a framework of
specific measures that can make enhanced-independence directors more
accountable to public investors and less dependent on the controller. In Section
B, we argue that public investors at controlled firms should have at least veto
rights over enhanced-independence directors’ initial appointment, reelection,
and termination. In Section C, we explain why even this minority-veto regime
leaves enhanced-independence directors too dependent on controlling
shareholders. Thus, we call for a regime that requires support from controllers
and public investors for the initial election of enhanced-independence
directors, but leaves controllers with no say over the reelection and termination
of these directors.
Providing public investors with a say in director elections raises a host of
complementary questions that are not directly related to the election regime’s
structure. We leave the analysis of these questions to the next Part.
A. Dimensions
A regime of director elections consists of many specific rules addressing
issues that may seem technical or mundane. The cumulative impact of these
rules, however, determines the boundaries of the power held by controlling
shareholders, public investors, and members of the board. In this Section, we
unpack the important dimensions of any director-election regime and identify
the different degrees of influence that public investors can enjoy with respect
to each dimension. Shareholders generally make three decisions concerning
director elections:
• Election of a new candidate to the board (initial appointment);
• Reelection of an incumbent director for another term (reelection); and
• Removal of an incumbent director before her term ends (termination).82
82 The regime governing director termination is important in our framework for two reasons.
First, without restrictions on its ability to terminate enhanced-independence directors, the controller
can circumvent public investors’ influence over enhanced-independence directors’ election. This is
consistent with the general rule that only the party who nominates a director can fire her. See, e.g., 8
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2016) (limiting the ability to remove directors with no cause to the
holders of the class of shares electing them). Second, placing limits on enhanced-independence directors’
termination can weaken these directors’ dependence on the controller even when public investors have
no say on director elections. Perhaps the weakest regime in our context would be to retain the controller’s
existing rights to elect directors, but to marginally insulate enhanced-independence directors by
preventing the controller from firing them, without public investors’ consent, before the end of their
predetermined terms. This rule would leave intact directors’ bond of loyalty stemming from their initial
election and from their desire for reelection. But an independent director—or a group of directors—who
rises against abuses by the controller would not automatically face the threat of an immediate dismissal.
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The powers of the controller and of public investors over each of these
dimensions will determine the extent to which enhanced-independence directors
are accountable to the latter and insulated from the former.83 For each of the
initial appointment, reelection, and termination decisions, public investors can
wield one of the following degrees of influence:84
•
•
•

No say in directors’ initial appointment, reelection, and termination. The
controller alone has the power to determine the outcome of the vote (the
controller-election rule). This is the historical norm for director election.85
Power to veto the controller’s decisions (the minority-veto rule or the vetorights rule).
Exclusive power to make a decision even against the controller’s objection
(the minority-election rule).

The degree of influence held by controllers and private investors does not
have to be the same for each type of decision. Policymakers can vary public
investors’ degree of influence across dimensions (choosing from among at
least twenty-seven specific combinations) to produce the precise balance of
power between controlling shareholders and public investors that they find
optimal. For example, granting public investors more power over reelection
than initial appointment decisions can create an appropriate balance between
the need to make enhanced-independence directors accountable to public
investors and the concern about undermining the controller’s ability to
manage the company.
At the same time, policymakers should be aware that adopting one regime
to govern one dimension may affect another dimension. Granting public
investors a say over initial appointment decisions, for example, will not have
much impact if the controlling shareholder has the unlimited power to fire
directors at will. Finally, note that lawmakers can take power away from the
controller without increasing the degree to which public investors can influence
director elections. For example, one could restrict the ability of controllers to
fire directors by setting mandatory terms limits without providing public
investors with the power to elect or veto directors.
Table A summarizes the options that are available for policymakers vis-à-vis
the prevailing regimes in the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Italy.

Although rare, there are cases in which directors decide to confront the controlling shareholder. See, e.g.,
In re Dole Food Co., Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 8703, 2015 WL 5052214, at *12 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015)
(describing two outside directors’ opposition to a self-tender proposed by the controller).
83 A director election regime often addresses other dimensions, such as directors’ term limits
and the right to nominate directors. We address these dimensions below. See infra Sections IV.C–D.
84 We assume for now that public investors make decisions through a majority-of-minority
vote. We discuss cumulative voting in subsection III.C.4.
85 See supra Section II.B.
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Table A: Director Election Regimes
ControllerElection Rule

Veto Rights

Minority Power

United Kingdom,
Israel

Italy, AMEX

Initial
Appointment

United States

Termination

United States,
United Kingdom,
Italy

Israel

AMEX

Renewal

United States

United Kingdom

Israel, AMEX

The gray-shaded column represents the prevailing U.S. regime. As
explained in Part II, the default regime in the United States, as in many other
countries, follows the controller-election rule for all dimensions: that is, the
controlling shareholder has the exclusive power to make initial appointment,
reelection, and termination decisions. Public investors have no say over these
decisions. A shareholder with a majority of the votes can elect all board
members, decide whether to renew their terms, or fire them at will.
Both the old AMEX guidelines and the Italian regime adopt the minorityelection rule with respect to directors’ initial election decisions.86 These regimes
empower public investors to appoint some fraction of board members even
against the controller’s objection. The United Kingdom’s new listing regime and
Israeli corporate law adopt the veto rights rule to govern enhanced-independence
directors’ initial appointments.87 Under the UK regime, for example, the
appointment of independent directors requires not only a majority of the votes
cast at the meeting but also a majority-of-minority shareholder vote.88
Israel and the United Kingdom, however, provide public investors with
different degrees of influence over director reelection decisions. While the United
Kingdom adopts the minority-veto rule, Israeli law adopts the minority-election
rule, under which public investors can decide to reelect an incumbent
enhanced-independence director even against the controller’s objections.
B. Veto Rights
In this Section, we argue that public investors should have at least veto
rights over enhanced-independence directors’ initial appointment, reelection,
and termination. Although it will not eliminate these directors’ dependence
86
87
88

See supra text accompanying notes 68–73.
See supra text accompanying notes 75–77, 79–80.
See supra text accompanying note 77.
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on the controller, this regime offers a compromise between the need to make
enhanced-independence directors accountable to public investors and the
concern that the minority-election rule will disrupt the controller’s ability to
run the company.89
1. Benefits
For enhanced-independence directors to be accountable to public
investors, these investors should have at least veto rights over the directors’
initial appointment and reelection. In other words, the minority-veto rule is
the threshold requirement for enhanced-independence directors. To prevent
the controlling shareholder from circumventing the regime by firing directors
who do not favor its own interests, public investors’ veto power should also
extend to enhanced-independence directors’ termination. Under this regime,
however, public investors cannot appoint enhanced-independence directors
to whom the controlling shareholder objects.
This minority-veto regime offers a compromise between the need to make
enhanced-independence directors accountable to public investors and the
concern that denying the controller any say over director election would
undermine its ability to run the company. Public investors cannot appoint
enhanced-independence directors or reelect them against the controller’s will,
but they can prevent the appointment of an enhanced-independence director
who is clearly beholden to the controller or whose reputation suggests that
she will not adequately safeguard public investors’ interests. Thus, while this
regime will not eliminate enhanced-independence directors’ dependence on
the controller, these directors still need public investors’ support for their
initial appointment and reelection.
Public investors’ veto power is perhaps most effective in the decision to
reelect an incumbent enhanced-independence director. Public investors will
presumably decide how to vote on the basis of the director’s past performance
on the board.90 A director who favored the controller’s interests over those of
the company or its public investors might be voted out of office. This, then,

89 See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J.
560, 594-605 (2016) (proposing a theory stressing the value of enabling controlling shareholders to
set the firm’s strategic direction).
90 For instance, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) examines the accountability,
responsiveness, composition, skills, and independence of each director and the board as a whole. A
combination of poor company performance and poor accountability may lead to a negative vote, as may
a lack of proper attendance and sitting on an excessive number of other boards. INSTITUTIONAL
S’HOLDER SERVS., UNITED STATES SUMMARY PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES: 2015 BENCHMARKS
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 11-15 (2015), http://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/1_2015-us-summary
-voting-guidelines-updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/53TM-LTFG].
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provides enhanced-independence directors with an incentive to cater to
public investors’ interests.
Critics may argue that this regime leaves the controller with too much
power. As we explain below, controllers are more likely than public investors
to make effective use of their veto rights, thereby undermining the
accountability incentives generated by the minority-veto rule. By contrast,
supporters of this regime may argue that it introduces a significant degree of
accountability to public investors while addressing the concern that the
minority-election rule will excessively interfere with the controller’s ability
to determine the company’s business strategy.
2. Implementing Veto Rights
The principal mechanism for granting public investors veto rights over an
enhanced-independence director’s initial appointment and reelection is
requiring that the director be approved by a majority of votes cast by public
investors—that is, shareholders unaffiliated with the controller—in addition
to an ordinary majority of shareholders. For example, assume that the
controlling shareholder holds sixty percent of the company’s voting rights. To
be elected under the minority-veto rule, an enhanced-independence director
would have to be approved by an ordinary majority (the controller) and by a
majority of the forty percent not affiliated with the controller.91
Granting public investors influence over enhanced-independence director
elections raises the issue of nomination rights. In other words, who will have
the power to nominate candidates for an enhanced-independence director
position? One can think of two approaches. Under one approach, only the
controlling shareholder (or the company or its nomination committee) can
put forward candidates for an enhanced-independence director position, and
public investors can only approve or reject the nominated candidate.
Alternatively, public investors (holding a certain percentage of shares) as well
as the controller can nominate candidates for the enhanced-independence
director position.

91 In controlled companies with a one-share-one-vote structure, another mechanism that could
be considered is requiring that enhanced-independence directors be approved by a supermajority of
the votes—say sixty-six percent. Such a rule has two benefits. First, it relieves companies and courts
of the complicated task of classifying shares into those affiliated and those unaffiliated with the
controller. Second, it provides a relatively simple mechanism for allowing controllers with larger
control blocks to have greater influence in electing enhanced-independence directors. Such an effect
is arguably desirable because controllers’ incentives to divert resources become weaker as their equity
stake increases.
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The right to nominate directors is rather consequential for widely held
firms,92 but may not be as important under the veto-rights rule. Even when
both public investors and the controlling shareholder have the same nominal
power to put a candidate up for election, the controller is more likely to use
its nomination right. Collective action problems that discourage dispersed
public investors from nominating candidates to the board. This disincentive
is exacerbated when it is clear that no director can be elected against the
controller’s objection. Nevertheless, we believe that public investors should
have the right to nominate candidates, as it would improve their bargaining
position vis-à-vis the controller.
Finally, one may argue that the veto rights regime can lead to a deadlock
in which the controller and public investors cannot agree on a candidate. We
believe, however, that this is not a significant concern. Even if a director
nominated by the company occasionally fails to get elected, the controller and
public investors will ultimately agree on a candidate, and the law could design
mechanisms for ensuring continuity in the interim.93 Moreover, the deadlock
threat would discourage controllers from nominating candidates whom public
investors are reasonably likely to reject.
C. Beyond Veto Rights?
The preceding Section presented the case for providing public investors
with at least a veto right over enhanced-independence directors’ initial
appointment, reelection, and termination. In our work for the Israeli
government, however, we recommended the adoption of a regime that went
beyond veto rights to provide public investors with the exclusive power to
appoint enhanced-independence directors. In this Section, we explain why
the veto rights regime, by itself, is unlikely to make enhanced-independence
directors effective monitors of controlling shareholders. Based on this
analysis, we present the case for a regime under which public investors have
at least the exclusive power at least over reelection and termination decisions.

92 Nomination rights also would be important under the minority-election rule that we discuss
in the next Section.
93 Another question is whether shareholders would use their power to vote on director
elections. This in turn may depend on whether institutional shareholders are required to cast a vote.
See Assaf Hamdani & Yishay Yafeh, Institutional Investors as Minority Shareholders, 17 REV. FIN. 691,
701 (2012) (finding that institutional investors in Israel do not vote on director elections even when
the law grants them the power to veto the controller’s candidates); see also Belcredi & Enriques,
supra note 69, at 9 (“[N]o Italian institutional investor is under a legal obligation to exercise its
voting rights in investee companies.”).
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1. Veto Rights May Not Be Enough
In theory, the veto-rights rule would make enhanced-independence
directors equally accountable to public investors and controlling shareholders.
However, in practice, inevitable differences between public investors and
controlling shareholders make this regime tilted in favor of the latter.
First, controllers enjoy a clear informational advantage over public
investors. Evaluating a new candidate for an enhanced-independence director
position requires information about the candidate’s qualifications and past
performance on other boards. Public investors suffer from collective action
problems, and they may lack incentives to acquire the information needed for
evaluating candidates.94 The controlling shareholder, in contrast, holds a
sufficiently large stake to provide it with the incentive to acquire that
information. This informational asymmetry between controllers and public
investors becomes stronger with respect to reelection and termination decisions,
as the controlling shareholder has superior access to nonpublic information about
the incumbent director’s past board performance.
Second, collective action problems may undermine public investors’ ability
to make effective use of their veto rights. As explained earlier,95 dispersed
public investors are less likely than the controller to nominate a candidate to an
enhanced-independence director position, especially when the controller
retains the right to nominate its own candidates to the board. To be sure, a
minority blockholder may find it worthwhile to incur the costs associated with
nominating a candidate, but, for the most part, public investors will tend not
nominate a candidate.
To summarize, these differences would undermine the effective exercise of
the powers bestowed on public investors by the veto-rights regime. Public
investors are most likely to use veto rights only to prevent the appointment of
clearly unqualified directors or the reelection of directors whose past performance
demonstrates a willingness to disregard public investors’ interests. By contrast,
the controller will likely effectively exercise its powers over director nomination,
election, and reelection. Even under this regime, therefore, enhancedindependence directors would likely remain more accountable to the controller
than to public investors.
2. Public Investors’ Election Rights
The minority-election regime provided a stronger measure for making
enhanced-independence directors accountable to public investors. This regime
94 See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 584-91
(1990) (discussing rational apathy and the dynamics of shareholders’ incentives to become informed).
95 See supra subsection III.B.2.
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provides public investors with the right to elect enhanced-independence
directors over the objections of the controlling shareholder. As with veto rights,
this regime provides enhanced-independence directors with incentives to
protect public investors, as these directors will depend on public investors’
support to be elected. Unlike veto rights, however, a minority-election regime
does not provide enhanced-independence directors with incentives to favor the
controller, whose support is not required for their continued service on the
board. Such a regime could eventually facilitate a market for professional
enhanced-independence directors whom public investors will nominate and elect.96
An effective minority-election rule requires that public investors, at least
occasionally, use their rights to appoint their own representatives to the board.
Moreover, eliminating incentives to favor the controller requires that the controller
be unable to exert influence over the election of enhanced-independence directors.
However, the experience with widely held firms in the United States
demonstrates that even insiders who lack formal power to nominate directors
may exert considerable influence over director elections through their de facto
control over the nomination process. Therefore, the ultimate impact of the
minority-election rule will depend both on the rules governing director
nominations and on the degree to which public investors will use their election
and nomination rights.
First, consider director nomination rules. Even if public investors have the
right to nominate enhanced-independence directors, the likelihood that public
investors will do so depends on the preconditions for making nominations. If the
percentage of shares required to nominate directors is too high, for example,
dispersed public investors may find it too costly to organize and put forward a list
of candidates. Thus, unless the company has a minority blockholder with enough
at stake, controlling shareholders will continue to influence director nominations.
Next, consider the extent to which public investors are likely to use their
nomination rights. Rules that facilitate director nomination by public investors
will eliminate the controller’s de facto control over the process only to the extent
that public investors actually use their power. This in turn may depend on the
degree of shareholder activism by institutional investors or on the presence of
activist hedge funds in each country.
At any rate, empowering public investors to nominate candidates does not
mean that those investors should always use that right. If they trust the
controller, public investors may vote for the controller’s candidates rather than
nominate their own. Yet, the mere power to nominate their own candidates
provides public investors with an important check on the controller.
96 For a proposal for creating a market of professional directors appointed by institutional
investors, see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for
Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991).
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The analysis thus far has addressed the concern that even the minority-election
rule would leave controllers with de facto influence over director elections. Another
potential objection to this rule, however, is that it provides public investors with too
much power. Allowing public investors to elect directors, so the argument goes,
would interfere with controlling shareholders’ ability to exercise appropriate
control over the corporation. Furthermore, it might be argued, this interference
would be counterproductive for public investors, who generally benefit from the
controllers’ monitoring of management.97
We consider these objections in Section V.A below. As we explain there,
enhanced-independence directors would have an important role only in those
cases where the legal system recognizes the need to protect public investors from
controllers’ conflicts. However, even those who are genuinely concerned that
providing public investors with full election rights would interfere with the
controller’s ability to manage the firm should accept a regime under which public
investors have exclusive power only over reelection and termination decisions.
We discuss this regime in the next subsection.
3. Reelection and Termination
Under this regime, both public investors and the controller have veto
rights at the initial appointment stage. At the reelection stage, however, the
minority-election rule applies and public investors can reelect an incumbent
director regardless of the controller’s position. To prevent controllers from
circumventing this reelection power, public investors should also have at least
veto rights over termination decisions. This regime addresses the concerns
underlying both the minority-veto rule, discussed in Section III.B., and the
minority-election regime, discussed in the preceding subsection.
First, the controller’s veto right at the initial election stage removes the
concern that the minority-election rule will interfere with the controller’s
ability to run the company or lead to the appointment of unfit directors. After
all, by supporting the directors’ initial election, the controlling shareholder
has signaled its judgment that these directors are qualified to join the board.
Even those who believe that the controller should have the power to veto
candidates can agree that from this point on, enhanced-independence
directors should be most concerned about the views of public investors.
Second, compared to the veto-rights rule, this regime bolsters enhancedindependence directors’ accountability to public investors. Because the controller
has no formal say over reelection and termination, directors will not depend on
the controller for the continuation of their service on the board and, therefore,
97 For an analysis of the potential cost of providing public investors at controlled companies
with excessive protection, see Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 89, at 595-98.
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have no significant incentive to accommodate the controller’s interests after
their initial appointment.
Third, this regime prevents controllers from circumventing any rules
against firing directors. A director who knows that her reelection depends on
the controller’s support may decide to resign if she feels that the controller is
unlikely to support her.98 With just a hint of the controller’s intentions, the
director might resign to save herself the embarrassment of not getting reelected
or nominated. By giving public investors sole authority for termination
decisions, the minority-election rule would preclude such measures.
Finally, this regime can be beneficial for legal systems wishing to pursue
a gradual approach to director-election reforms at controlled companies. For
example, countries where public investors currently have no say in enhancedindependence director elections may want to start with a regime that grants
public investors some limited powers without denying the controller any role.
To be sure, this intermediate regime leaves controllers with considerable
influence over enhanced-independence directors. Directors will remain
dependent on the controller for their initial appointment, and, as under the
prevailing regime, they might feel gratitude towards the shareholder who
appointed them—in other words, “You dance with the one who brought you
to the party.” As we explained above, however, this regime alleviates any
concerns that eliminating the controller’s ability to conduct initial screening
of candidates would prove counterproductive.99
4. Cumulative Voting
The analysis has thus far assumed that the mechanism for providing
public investors with election rights is subjecting enhanced-independence
director election to a majority-of-minority vote. Another way to allow public
investors to elect directors is with a cumulative voting system.
Cumulative voting essentially provides for proportional board representation,
in which a sufficiently large minority can elect one or more board members.100
Under “straight” voting, shareholders hold a separate vote for each seat. Thus, a
98 See Michaël Dewally & Sarah W. Peck, Upheaval in the Boardroom: Outside Director Public
Resignations, Motivations, and Consequences, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 38, 51 (2010) (“[D]irectors resign when
they feel they can no longer monitor the CEO.”).
99 One can think of complex or intermediate versions of this regime. For example, a regime under
which the controller has to elect a list of candidates (say twice the number of open enhanced-independence
director positions on the board) from which public investors will have to choose. We do not discuss such
complex variations in this Article.
100 For a formal analysis of the likely outcomes of cumulative voting under different patterns
of share ownership, see Arthur T. Cole, Jr., Legal and Mathematical Aspects of Cumulative Voting, 2
S.C.L.Q. 225 (1950), and Amihai Glazer et al., Cumulative Voting in Corporate Elections: Introducing
Strategy into the Equation, 35 S.C. L. REV. 295, 299-308 (1984).
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shareholder with a majority of the votes can elect all board members. In a
cumulative voting system, shareholders vote for candidates as a group: each
share entitles its owner to as many votes as there are directors to be elected, and
shareholders can allocate their votes among candidates as they choose.101
Cumulative voting can, in some cases, enable public investors to elect
directors. It might thereby be superior to the prevailing regime, under which
the controller alone elects all board members.102 Nevertheless, we find
cumulative voting to be overall inferior to the minority-election rule.
First, cumulative voting cannot be used to produce some of the
intermediate regimes designed to balance public investor protection against
controller rights. For example, it would be quite challenging to use this
mechanism to provide public investors with different degrees of influence over
different decisions concerning director election say, one that applies the
minority-veto rule to initial appointments but the minority-election rule to
reelection and termination decisions.
Second, cumulative voting is difficult to combine with a regime that assigns
special tasks to enhanced-independence directors. Enhanced-independence
directors should play an active role in monitoring controllers’ conflicts, such as
vetting self-dealing transactions, but under cumulative voting, it may be difficult to

101 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 124, 127 n.8 (1994) (describing the features of cumulative voting). Another
regime that would enable public investors to appoint at least some representatives to the board is
“list voting.” For an analysis of this regime and a proposal to adopt it even for companies without
controlling shareholders, see Marco Ventoruzzo, Empowering Shareholders in Directors’ Elections: A
Revolution in the Making, 8 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 105 (2011).
102 Cumulative voting offers two advantages over the majority-of-minority regime. First, it
obviates the need to engage in the complicated task of identifying shareholders unaffiliated with the
controller. Second, it provides controllers with greater influence. Assume that the board has ten
members. A controller with fifty-one percent of the votes would be able to elect at least five board
members; a controller with eighty percent of the votes, in contrast, would be able to elect at least
eight board members. This outcome is consistent with the view that public investors’ protection
should become weaker as the percentage of the controller’s economic ownership increases. See
Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1911, 1947-49 (1996) (arguing that cumulative voting can give “large minority shareholders a place
on the board and a voice in board actions”); see also Bernard Black et al., Corporate Governance in
Korea at the Millennium: Enhancing International Competitiveness: Final Report and Legal Reform
Recommendations to the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Korea, 26 J. CORP. L. 537, 589-90 (2001)
(recommending that Korea strengthen cumulative voting to protect large minority shareholders);
Pritchard, supra note 38, at 21-22 (arguing that making cumulative voting mandatory would allow
institutional investors in Korea “to have an effective voice” on board composition). Cumulative
voting is common in Chile. See WORLD BANK, REPORT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS
AND CODES (ROSC): CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNTRY ASSESSMENT: CHILE 4 (2003),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/14493/350180CL0Corporate0govern
ance0rosc1chlcg.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UBP-V7WM]. In Brazil, cumulative voting is a right of
“shareholders holding at least 10% of the common shares.” Bernard S. Black et al., Corporate Governance
in Brazil, 11 EMERGING MARKETS REV. 21, 29 (2010).
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identify the directors whom public investors actually elected. Third, cumulative
voting can enable a minority shareholder with a substantial stake to appoint a
director of whom the majority of public investors disapprove. In contrast, a
majority-of-minority requirement ensures that such a minority blockholder
will be able to get a director on the board only if the majority of public investors
support her; the requirement thus addresses the concern that the blockholder
would be able to use the director to its benefit at the expense of the majority of
public investors.103
IV. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In the remainder of this Article, we use the term enhanced-independence
directors to refer to independent directors whose appointment, reelection, and
termination are at least subject to the minority-veto regime. In this Part, we
turn to discuss how policymakers could implement reforms designed to
promote enhanced-independence directors.
Section A focuses on legal regimes—most notably Delaware’s corporate
law—that use judicial review standards for encouraging the use of independent
directors. We explain that, in such regimes, courts can similarly encourage the
use of enhanced-independence directors by according substantial deference to
director approval of conflicted decisions only when the approval is made by
enhanced-independence directors. Section B in turn considers regimes that use
legislation, regulations, or listing standards to require publicly traded
companies to appoint independent directors and have them play a role in
vetting conflicted decisions. We explain that, in such regimes, it would be
desirable to replace substantial reliance on independent directors with reliance
on enhanced-independence directors.
The remainder of this Part discusses implementation issues that both regimes
need to consider. Section C examines the number of enhanced-independence
directors that should be on a board and the role that they should play. Section D
considers the role of term limits in supplementing enhanced-independence
director election rules. Section E discusses whether enhanced-independence
directors should be independent from minority blockholders.

103 Another difficulty with cumulative voting is that it requires complicated adjustments for
companies with a staggered board, for companies with a dual-class voting structure, or for companies
whose shareholders have special election rights. See McDonough v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp.,
277 F. Supp. 6, 7-8 (E.D. Mich. 1967) (discussing an attempt to evade mandatory cumulative voting
rules by staggering the board).
For completeness, we should also note that cumulative voting has the advantage of making it
unnecessary to identify shareholders unaffiliated with the controller. Still, for the reasons explained
above, we view cumulative voting to be overall inferior to the minority-election regime.
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A. Regimes Based on Judicial Review
For concreteness, we shall focus below on Delaware, the most well-known
regime that is based on judicial review. Delaware’s corporate statute does not
require companies to appoint independent directors. Rather, Delaware’s courts
use standards of judicial review to encourage companies to appoint independent
directors and to assign them a role in approving conflicted decisions.104
As we explained above, however, directors whose appointment, retention
and termination are solely determined by the controller cannot be relied on to
guard against controller opportunism. Therefore, Delaware courts should not
grant any substantial cleansing power to approval of conflicted decisions by
independent directors. Courts can encourage the use of enhanced-independence
directors by according substantial deference to director approval of conflicted
decisions only when the approval is made by enhanced-independence directors.
Reliance on enhanced-independence to guard against controller opportunism
would be far superior to reliance on independent directors who are completely
dependent on the controller for their appointment.
Indeed, adopting the enhanced-independence approach might, in some
cases, provide an option to avoid more costly interventions. Some Delaware
court decisions, such as the recent decision by Vice Chancellor Laster in
EzCorp, have expressed reluctance to defer to approval of self-dealing
transactions by independent directors appointed by the controller.105 Under this
approach, any self-dealing transaction by the controller, however small in scale,
would be subject to close judicial scrutiny if challenged unless approved by a
majority-of-the-minority shareholder vote. Either route would involve
significant costs. Enhanced-independence directors offer an alternative route
with a cleansing device that some might deem to be sufficiently effective to
forgo such interventions.
Finally, we should note that the judicial approach considered in this Section
would encourage rather than require companies to have enhanced-independence
directors. Controllers could decide not to have enhanced-independence directors
if they viewed them as too costly. In such a case, the controller would have to
104 See supra text accompanying notes 32–34. The analysis here applies to any legal system that
relies on courts to encourage companies to appoint independent directors and entrust them with
reviewing self-dealing transactions. For a thoughtful analysis of the role of judicial review in regulating
self-dealing transactions, see Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory
Meets Reality, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 393 (2003).
105 See In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., No. 9962, 2016 WL 301245, at
*11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016) (“Under current law, the entire fairness framework governs any transaction
between a controller and the controlled corporation in which the controller receives a non-ratable
benefit.”); T. Rowe Price Recovery Fund, L.P. v. Rubin, 770 A.2d 536, 552 (Del. Ch. June 23, 2000)
(“[B]oth the Supreme Court and this court explicitly held that the entire fairness standard of review
applies in the non-merger context to interested transaction involving controlling stockholders.”).
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either avoid self-dealing transactions and other conflicted decisions or bear the
costs of having them subject to judicial scrutiny.
B. Regimes Based on Legislation or Regulation
As explained above, jurisdictions in other parts of the world have legal rules
requiring controlled companies to have independent directors and requiring
that these directors approve certain conflicted decisions.106 Our analysis
indicates that it would be preferable for these jurisdictions to replace their
substantial reliance on independent directors with substantial reliance on
enhanced-independence directors.
To implement the enhanced-independence approach, such jurisdictions
would have to adopt their own system of rules that address the aspects of the
enhanced-independence regime that we discuss in this Article. Among other
things, such a jurisdiction would have to specify the required number of
enhanced-independence directors; the type of input rights that public investors
would have at the initial election, retention, and termination stages; and the
type of corporate decisions that enhanced-independence directors would have
to approve. The framework that we provide in this Article could be useful for
the design of the necessary rules and regulations.
C. Number and Role of Enhanced-Independence Directors
Our analysis thus far has focused on the director election regime. In this
Section, we discuss the supplementary arrangements required to ensure that,
once elected, enhanced-independence directors will be able to play a
meaningful role in vetting conflicted decisions. Our analysis aims to highlight
the principal considerations that should guide policymakers. A full analysis of
these issues is beyond the scope of this Article.
Enhanced-independence directors cannot protect public investors unless
they hold sufficient power over conflicted decisions. At the same time, providing
these directors with too much power might undermine the controller’s ability to
run the firm. Thus, enhanced-independence directors should play a dominant
role in reviewing conflicted decisions but take a backseat with respect to other
corporate affairs.
1. Role
On the one hand, as enhanced-independence directors become more
accountable to public investors, the controller and the directors it puts in place
might try to marginalize enhanced-independence directors. Even if they are
106

See supra text accompanying notes 36–42.
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genuinely accountable to public investors, enhanced-independence directors
cannot adequately safeguard public investors’ interests if such directors lack the
power to veto self-dealing and other tunneling transactions.107
On the other hand, providing enhanced-independence directors with overly
broad powers can interfere with the controller’s ability to run the company even
when its interests align with those of public investors. Practically, the controller
exercises its control by appointing its representatives to the board. As directors
become less dependent on the controller for their election, the controller’s
ability to exert influence over the company’s direction declines. Under the
minority-election regime, for example, public investors can elect directors even
against the controller’s objection. These minority-elected directors may have
their own views concerning the direction that the company should take, thereby
interfering with the controller’s ability to exercise control.108
Therefore, lawmakers should not grant enhanced-independence directors too
much power over issues that raise no conflict between the controller and public
investors. As a matter of principle, the role of enhanced-independence directors
should track the fundamental distinction between business and self-dealing
transactions. These directors should play a critical role in decisions that raise
concerns about a conflict of interest between the controller and public investors.
They should thus have the power to review, negotiate, and approve freezeouts
and other self-dealing transactions involving the controlling shareholder.109 But
the controller-elected directors should be able to decide such issues as the firm’s
business strategy even over enhanced-independence directors’ objections.110
107 See, e.g., Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 31 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 125, 209-10 (2006) (noting, with respect to Chinese corporate law, that “[c]orporate
officers and fellow directors have few incentives to listen to independent directors because
independent directors have little in the way of veto power over corporate actions”).
108 One of us has recently argued that controllers may find it difficult to convey to independent
directors the value of their vision for the company. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 89, at 601
(“[A]symmetric information and differences of opinion could prevent the controller-entrepreneur
from credibly communicating her idiosyncratic vision . . . .”).
109 Should enhanced-independence directors play a role in monitoring financial disclosure?
While a full analysis of this question is outside the scope of this Article, we are inclined to answer
this question in the negative for two reasons. First, although controllers may occasionally have
reasons to mislead public investors (when they raise capital, for example), it seems that financial
disclosure is not a pervasive source of conflicts between controllers and public investors. Second,
given the severe legal and reputational sanctions associated with misreporting, it is unclear that
making directors accountable to minority investors would play a meaningful role in inducing
independent directors to ensure accurate reporting.
110 Drawing the line between conflicted and nonconflicted decisions regarding the public
investors’ interests is not always easy. For discussions of the difficulties involved in drawing this line,
see Luca Enriques, Related Party Transactions: Policy Options and Real-World Challenges (With a Critique
of the European Commission Proposal), 16 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 1, 2 (2014); and Goshen &
Hamdani, supra note 89, at 606-08. As noted earlier, this Article does not seek to contribute to the
identification of the corporate decisions that the law should regard as conflicted.
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2. Number
Because enhanced-independence directors should play an important role in
evaluating and approving conflicted decisions, we believe that companies should
appoint at least two such directors.111 At the same time, enhanced-independence
directors should not constitute a majority of the board. As we explained above,
granting these directors too much say over corporate affairs may undermine the
controller’s ability to set the strategic direction of the firm. Were enhancedindependence directors to constitute a majority of the board, they would have the
power to set the firm’s direction and make other decisions over the objections of
the controller’s representatives, even in the absence of any conflict of interest.
Thus, limiting enhanced-independence directors to a minority of the board offers
a reasonable balance between controller management and minority protection.
D. Length of Appointment
Arrangements concerning directors’ terms in office can supplement rules
concerning their elections. The need for term limits and tenure requirements
generally arises when the director election regime leaves even enhancedindependence directors somewhat dependent on the controller, such as under
the minority-veto rule. As we explain in this Section, however, this need may
arise for other reasons, including when public investors have substantial
influence over director elections.
Consider first the prevailing regime, under which the controller-election
rule applies and companies do not have enhanced-independence directors.
Although independent directors are not accountable to public investors,
subjecting them to both term limits and minimum-tenure requirements limits
controllers’ ability to terminate them and, consequently, weakens their
dependence on the controllers. To be sure, these directors will depend on the
controller for their initial appointment and reelection. Yet, limiting how many
years they can serve constrains the controller’s ability to “reward” directors with
reelection.112 At some point, these directors will have to leave the board
111 As described above, the regime in Italy requires only one enhanced-independence director.
See Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 69, at 8; see also supra text accompanying notes 70–73.
112 Note that Delaware courts have not taken the view that an especially long time of board service
at a controlled company categorically undermines director independence. See, e.g., Friedman v. Dolan,
No. 9425, 2015 WL 4040806, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (holding that “[n]either long-term board
service nor the mere fact that one was appointed by a controller suffices” to subvert independence
(citations omitted); In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6623, 2013 WL 396202, at *6
n.63 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2013) (explaining that allegations of “‘nearly twenty years of Board service
alongside [one director] and a long-term relationship with [another director]’ . . . [did] not raise a
reasonable doubt as to . . . independence under Delaware law” (quoting Verified Consolidated Second
Amended Class Action Complaint ¶ 68, BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6623, 2013 WL
396202 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2013) (No. 6623))). For a thorough analysis of the effect of director tenure on
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regardless of the controller’s satisfaction with their service. Similarly, requiring
that directors serve for some predetermined number of years before they can
be replaced ensures that the controller would not be able to displace directors
who do not cater to its interests.113
Now consider a regime that adopts the minority-election rule, in which
public investors can appoint enhanced-independence directors against the
controller’s objection. Under this regime, term limits are unnecessary and
even harmful. These enhanced-independence directors will be accountable to
public investors and have no dependence on the controller. Without any term
limits, they will face ongoing incentives to act in a manner that will be
beneficial for public investors.
Finally, consider the regime in which public investors have only veto rights
over an enhanced-independence director’s initial appointment but can reelect
that director even against the controller’s objections. In this case, term limits
may be required to protect the controller. This regime’s underlying premise is
that the controller’s support for a director at the initial appointment stage
ensures that this director is qualified to serve on the board. Yet, without term
limits, public investors could permanently force a director on the majority
shareholder simply because of that shareholder’s initial consent to her
appointment. Indeed, Israeli corporate law, which adopts this regime, imposes
a limit on the number of years that these directors can serve on the board.114
E. Independence from Minority Blockholders
Should enhanced-independence directors be independent from public
investors, especially from significant blockholders who nominated them? 115 We
do not take a firm position on this question but would like to flag it.
Policymakers should consider this issue, especially where enhanced-independence
arrangements provide public investors with full election rights.
To illustrate, assume that the controller owns sixty percent of the
company’s shares and that the minority-election rule applies. In this regime,
public investors have the exclusive right to appoint enhanced-independence
directors regardless of the controller’s view. Assume further that a large investor,
owning eight percent of the shares, nominates an enhanced-independence
director independence, see generally Yaron Nili, The “New Insiders”: Rethinking Independent Directors’
Tenure, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 97 (2016).
113 See, e.g., In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., 2015 WL 5052214, at *1528 (Del. Ch. Aug.
27, 2015) (describing how a controlling shareholder and one of his senior executives forced an outside
director who opposed a self-tender offer proposed by the controller to resign).
114 They can serve no more than three terms of three years. See Israeli Companies Law, 5759–1999,
§ 245, 44 (1999-119).
115 For a discussion raising concerns about directors who are not independent of the minority
shareholders that nominated them, see Gutiérrez & Sáez, supra note 6, at 91.
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director. Clearly, this director should be independent of the controller and the
company. But should she be independent from the blockholder who put forward
her candidacy?
The case against this new independence requirement relies on the premise
that shareholders with a significant equity stake have an incentive to monitor
corporate insiders for the benefit of the company and its public investors.
Having blockholders’ representatives on the board will enable them to monitor
corporate insiders more effectively. Indeed, studies have found that the
presence of blockholders on the board tends to improve pay practices and
CEO accountability.116 Moreover, unlike controlling shareholders under the
majority-election rule, blockholders in our setting (i.e., minority shareholders
with a significant equity stake) cannot dictate the outcome of a shareholder
vote. Rather, a blockholder-nominated candidate will join the board only if a
majority-of-minority shareholders support her candidacy.117 This majority-ofminority requirement alleviates the concern that blockholders might appoint
directors in order to pursue their own agendas.118
The case for requiring extra independence focuses on the concern that
blockholders who nominate directors may pursue their own agendas to extract
private benefits or disrupt the controller’s ability to run the firm. Directors
with no ties to a blockholder are more likely to advance the interests of the
company and its public investors even when that blockholder nominated them
for the position.119

116 See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors, 65 J. FIN. 2363, 2365 (2010)
(finding that having a compensation committee that is both independent and includes at least one
blockholder reduces the likelihood of “lucky” option grants to corporate executives); see also Anup
Agrawal & Tareque Nasser, Blockholders on Boards and CEO Compensation, Turnover and Firm
Valuation 26 (Sept. 1, 2012) (Am. Fin. Ass’n 2012 Chi. Meetings Paper, 2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=1443431 [https://perma.cc/G4GC-97EA] (finding that CEOs of firms with blockholder directors tend
to have lower pay and higher turnover-performance sensitivity).
117 As we explained earlier, the need to prevent blockholders from having the power to appoint
directors not supported by a majority of minority investors is an important reason to disfavor
cumulative voting. See supra subsection III.C.4.
118 Some of the issues that we analyze here arise also in the context of widely held firms, where
the question is whether directors nominated by activist investors should be independent from these
investors. For a discussion of these issues in the latter context, see generally Matthew D. Cain et al.,
How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 649 (2016), and
Yaron Nili, Servants of Two Masters? The Feigned Hysteria over Activist-Paid Directors, 18 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 509 (2016).
119 Note that the need for independence from a nominating blockholder is significantly reduced
when the controller can veto public investors’ candidates to the board. The controller would
presumably use its veto power to prevent the appointment of a director whose goal is to enable
blockholders to extract private benefits of control.
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V. OBJECTIONS
This Part considers potential objections to our proposals. Section A
addresses the claim that providing public investors—that is, minority
shareholders—with a say over director elections will undermine the
controller’s ability to run the company. Section B considers the claim that
enhanced-independence directors might undermine board effectiveness and
collegiality. Section C discusses the claim that granting public investors a say
over director elections might enable minority blockholders to extract private
benefits. Section D explains why enhanced-independence directors improve
investor protection even when self-dealing transactions are subject to a vote
by public investors.
Before considering these objections, we would like to note that our
framework accommodates many different degrees of public investor
influence. Thus, even if one finds any of the following objections convincing,
the appropriate response may be to choose a regime that provides a different
balance between public investors and the controller’s power to appoint
enhanced-independence directors.
A. Undermining Control
The first objection we address is that allowing public investors to elect
directors will interfere with the controlling shareholders’ ability to exercise
control over the corporation. On this view, minority shareholders in a controlled
company have accepted, and might indeed prefer, that the controller will
determine the strategic and business path of the company. We have discussed this
objection at several points above, so our analysis in this Section can be brief.
Ultimately, enhanced-independence directors would not undermine the
controller’s ability to determine business decisions that do not involve a conflict.
Recall that our analysis focuses on regimes that chose to rely on independent
directors to contain controllers’ opportunism. The goal of encouraging
companies to appoint enhanced-independence directors is to provide at least
some directors with incentives to stand up to the controller when undesirable
self-dealing takes place. The question, however, is whether directors who are
genuinely accountable to public investors will disrupt the controller’s ability to
make other business decisions or determine the company’s direction. For the
reasons we explain below, we believe that enhanced-independence directors will
not necessarily interfere with the controller’s ability to make business decisions.
First, note that controlling shareholders occasionally grant minority
blockholders the right to board representation.120 Having these representatives
120 See J. Travis Laster & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, The Rights and Duties of Blockholder Directors,
70 BUS. LAW. 33, 60 (2014/2015) (arguing that both majority and minority constituency directors should
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on the board, however, does not necessarily undermine the controllers’ ability
to run the company. Our framework can be viewed as granting dispersed public
investors rights similar to those that minority blockholders may receive.
Second, as explained in subsection IV.C.2, policymakers should ensure
that enhanced-independence directors remain a minority of board members
and play a key role only when the controller is conflicted. Ensuring that
enhanced-independence directors can veto only a limited subset of decisions
would address disruption concerns while preserving the directors’ incentives
to protect public investors. Indeed, as public investors have more power over
director elections, policymakers should take greater care to ensure that
enhanced-independence directors can block only those transactions in which
a clear conflict of interest exists.
Third, the concern that the minority-election rule undermines the
controller’s ability to run the firm should not necessarily preclude public
investors from having a say over director elections. At most, this concern
suggests that the veto-rights rule should govern initial appointment decisions;
that is, controllers should have veto power over initial appointments while the
minority-election rule applies to reelection and termination decisions.
Finally, note that we do not argue that legal systems should rely on
independent directors to monitor conflicted decisions. Those who believe that
enhanced-independence directors would impose an excessive burden on
corporate decisionmaking should consider replacing independent director
approval with other measures for addressing controller opportunism. However,
as we have shown in this Article, they should not place substantial reliance on
independent-director vetting of conflicted decisions.
B. Loss of Collegiality and Cohesiveness
The second objection we consider focuses on the unique nature of the board’s
work. An effective board requires an environment that facilitates cooperation
among board members and fosters trust between the board as a whole and
corporate insiders. Having even a few directors who represent public investors,
so the argument goes, would interfere with board cohesiveness and undermine
the trust between the board and corporate insiders, as directors will become
adversarial and uncooperative when seeking reelection by public investors.

compromise to ensure a balance of rights); Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of
Constituency Directors, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 309, 365-77 (2013) (taking the position that current
fiduciary rules should be reformed to keep constituency directors in check); E. Norman Veasey &
Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing
Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 774-75 (2008) (arguing that the current standards of fiduciary
duty and liability are sufficient to ensure that constituency directors act on behalf of all shareholders).
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We would first like to note that objections of this type arise, even at widely
held companies, against any form of external intervention in the boards’ work or
composition, including the fundamental requirement for independent directors
and even director liability.121 Yet, as recent developments in the U.S. regime
governing widely held companies demonstrate, the goal of incentive alignment
prevails over collegiality concerns. Indeed, there are those who believe that
external intervention is necessary to overcome the reluctance of individual directors
to challenge group consensus.122 Moreover, board cohesiveness may not be
desirable when a genuine conflict arises between controllers and public investors.
C. Public Investor Passivity
We have thus far addressed arguments that enhanced-independence
directors would overburden public companies and their controllers. One may
argue, however, that enhanced-independence directors would provide public
investors with insufficient protection, because public investors are likely to
remain passive. Rationally apathetic investors, the argument goes, would fail
to make an effective use of their power to elect directors. This, in turn, would
make enhanced-independence directors too favorable to the controller and
insufficiently attentive to the interests of the minority shareholders.
This concern is clearly inconsistent with market conditions in the United
States and other developed markets where shareholder activists, institutional
investors, and proxy advisory firms are prominent. Even in less developed
capital markets, however, this claim does not undermine the case for our
proposed regime.
The proposed regime introduces an important safety valve that can bolster
investor protection even when public investors largely remain passive. Public
investors may decide to use their election rights when controllers divert value
on a large scale or when an activist shareholder emerges. The prospect of public
investors rejecting that shareholder’s candidate or nominating their own
candidates (under the minority-election regime) will thus have some deterrent
effect on controlling shareholders.

121 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 49-50 (2002) (arguing that judicial review might destroy the
“interpersonal relationships” that foster internal board governance); Donald C. Langevoort, The
Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and
Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 800 (2001) (arguing that “too much true independence in the
boardroom . . . [can] reduc[e] the level of trust that comes from closer or less adversarial
relationships, [] chill[] communication . . . and interfere[] with the board as a productive team in all
its capacities, including monitoring”).
122 See generally Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1233, 1237 (2003) (explaining the role of social psychology in the Enron Board’s actions).
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At any rate, the introduction of enhanced-independence directors would be
an improvement over the prevailing regime of director election. Concern over
public investors’ passivity, however, may require policymakers to supplement
the proposed regime with other measures of investor protection, such as private
or public enforcement.
D. Public Investor Opportunism
One may argue that minority shareholders holding relatively large blocks
of shares might opportunistically use veto rights or the minority-election
regime to blackmail the controller to extract private benefits.123 Under the
minority-election rule, for example, these blockholders might deliberately
nominate people who would threaten to disrupt the board’s work to blackmail
the controller.
We find this critique unconvincing. A strategy of disrupting value-enhancing
projects will harm not only the controller but also public investors. Thus, an
opportunistic minority blockholder—one who nominates board candidates for
the sole purpose of blackmailing the controller—is unlikely to secure the public
investor votes required to appoint its candidate. Moreover, it is now commonly
believed that significant controller-backed self-dealing transactions should be
subject to a vote by public investors, i.e., a majority of minority shareholders.124
Such votes already provide an opportunistic minority blockholder with at least
the same power to extract private benefits as would public investor votes on
director elections.
Finally, enhanced-independence directors could be required to be
independent from blockholders who put forward their nomination. This
requirement, in turn, would address concerns that blockholders may use their
influence over director nominations to extract private benefits.

123 See, e.g., Feedback Statement: Summary of Responses to the Commission Green Paper on the
EU Corporate Governance Framework 16 (Nov. 15, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/
docs/modern/20111115-feedback-statement_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VKR9-YVAE] (explaining that many
people believe granting minority shareholders additional rights to help them represent their interests
could increase the potential for the abuse of those rights and would be “contrary to shareholder equality”).
124 See, e.g., In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 500-05, 520-36 (Del. Ch. 2013) (noting
that “the majority-of-the-minority vote condition qualifies as a cleansing device under traditional
Delaware corporate law principles”); Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing,
88 J. FIN. ECON. 430, 461 (2008) (surveying the prevalence of majority-of-minority shareholder
approval for self-dealing transactions in a large number of jurisdictions, and emphasizing this
requirement’s crucial role in protecting public investors).
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CONCLUSION
Corporate law has long relied on independent directors to protect public
investors from controller opportunism in conflicted decisions. In this Article,
however, we have shown that independent directors whose election and
retention is fully dependent on the controller cannot be relied upon to
adequately perform their oversight role.
To make independent directors more effective in overseeing conflicted
decisions, we have argued, public investors should have the power to influence
the election or retention of some “enhanced-independence” directors. These
enhanced-independence directors should play a key role in vetting conflicted
decisions, but they should not be able to prevent the controller or their fellow
directors from making other corporate decisions.
We have discussed how the Delaware courts, as well as other lawmakers in
the United States and around the world, can introduce enhanced-independence
arrangements. In Delaware, judicial doctrines encouraging the introduction of
enhanced-independence directors can address challenges that courts have faced
in reviewing conflicted decisions in controlled companies. We have identified
alternative mechanisms for providing public investors with a say over the
appointment or retention of enhanced-independence directors, and we have
analyzed the tradeoffs that these mechanisms entail. We have also discussed the
desirable role of such directors and have responded to a number of objections
to their use. Our hope is that the approach and framework of analysis we have
put forward in this Article will serve courts and lawmakers in improving
investor protection in controlled companies.

